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R. Feldman defends a general principle about evidence the slogan form of which says that 
‘evidence of evidence is evidence’ (cf. 2014: 284–99, 2011 and 2007: 194-214). B. Fitelson (2012: 
85–88) considers three renditions of this principle and contends they are all falsified by 
counterexamples. Against both Feldman and Fitelson, J. Comesaña and E. Tal (2015: 557-59) show 
that the third rendition––the one actually endorsed by Feldman––isn’t affected by Fitelson’s 
counterexamples, but only because it is trivially true and thus uninteresting. Tal and Comesaña 
(2015) defend a fourth version of Feldman’s principle, which––they claim––‘has not yet been 
shown false’ (p. 16). Against Tal and Comesaña, I will show that this new version of Feldman’s 
principle is in fact false. 
The third version of Feldman’s principle considered by Fitelson (2014) is this: 
 
(EEE3) If S1 possesses evidence, E1, that supports the proposition that S2 possesses 
evidence, E2, that supports P, then S1 possesses evidence, E3, that supports P.   
    
EEE3 has been defended by Feldman (2011). Furthermore, Feldman (2014: 292) endorses a 
restatement of this principle that is only unimportantly different. Here is Fitelson’s alleged 
counterexample to EEE3: S1’s background information says that a card c will be picked out 
randomly from a standard deck. S1 is then told that S2 knows which card c is exactly, and that: 
 
(E1) c is a black card. 
 
 
In these circumstances, E1 gives S1 some support for the proposition that S2 possesses the following 
information: 
 
(E2) c is the ace of spades. 
  
Furthermore, E2 entails and supports the proposition: 
 




In this setting, upon learning E1, S1 acquires evidence that supports the proposition that S2 possesses 
evidence E2 that supports P. So EEE3’s antecedent is satisfied. However––Fitelson contends––S1 
doesn’t have any evidence E3 that supports P. For we can stipulate that in this scenario all evidence 
S1 possesses about c is constituted by E1, the proposition that S2 knows which card c is exactly, and 
any consequence of these two propositions. But none of these propositions is––according to 
Fitelson––evidence for P. Since EEE3’s antecedent is satisfied but not its consequent, EEE3 is false. 
Comesaña and Tal (2015) retort that this is no counterexample to EEE3. For in this 
scenario––pace Fitelson––S1 has some evidence E3 supporting P. For example, S1 believes the 
trivial consequence of E1, 
 
c is not the Jack of hearts, 
 
which supports P. Comesaña and Tal emphasize that this upshot doesn’t actually help Feldman 
because: 
 
For any pair of propositions E and Q (about which the subject in question is not already 
certain), something entailed by E supports Q: for instance, the disjunction either E or Q. 
Therefore, Feldman’s EEE3 is only trivially true, and so the fact that it is not refuted by 
Fitelson’s case is irrelevant.                              (2015: 559, edited) 
 
The moral is that Feldman can reject Fitelson’s contention that EEE3 has a counterexample, but this 
is a Pyrrhic victory because EEE3’s truth is immaterial to the general epistemological thesis that 
Feldman would like to substantiate. I endorse this conclusion. 
To rescue the evidence-of-evidence-is-evidence principle from the triviality problem and 
other difficulties, Tal and Comesaña (2015: 14) propose replacing EEE3 with this principle: 
 
(EEE4) For all E and Q, if (i) E is evidence that there is some evidence for Q and (ii) E is not 
a defeater for the support that the proposition that there is evidence for Q provides 
for Q, then E is evidence for Q.  
 
In EEE4, ‘evidence’ means any true proposition regardless of its being possessed by a subject. Since 
Feldman (2014: §15.2) thinks of evidence as a proposition possessed by a subject, EEE4 may be 
unsuitable to render the principle he has in mind. EEE4 is afflicted by a more serious problem: it is 
 3 
not trivially true but just false. For there are many pairs of ordinary propositions E and Q (about 
which we are uncertain) that satisfy EEE4’s antecedent but not EEE4’s consequent.  
Take E and Q from two disparate domains––for instance, E = ‘Aristotle used to snore’ and 
Q = ‘There is a mouse in my house’. Even so, E and Q satisfy (i) because E is evidence that there is 
some evidence for Q––namely, any (uncertain) proposition E* that entails both E and Q (e.g. the 
conjunction E & Q). This is so because E* entails E. Thus E is evidence for E*. (As E* entails E, E 
confirms E* in the sense that Pr(E*|E) > Pr(E*), if Pr(E*) > 0 and Pr(E) < 1.) Furthermore, E* 
entails Q. Thus E* is evidence for Q. But E and Q also satisfy (ii), for it is intuitively true that E is 
not a defeater for the support that the proposition that there is evidence for Q provides for Q. 
A way to flesh out this intuition is the following: the existential proposition that there is 
evidence for Q can be construed as a disjunction each disjunct of which states that [En, and En 
supports Q] for any relevant En. E would be a defeater for the support that this disjunction provides 
for Q only if E were a defeater for the support that all or most of these disjuncts individually supply 
for Q. But we have no reason to believe this is the case. Rather, we have reasons to believe the 
opposite. Take for example En = ‘There are chew marks on the cupboard’. Clearly, E isn’t a 
defeater for the support that [there are chew marks on the cupboard, and the proposition that there 
are chew marks on the cupboard supports Q] provides for Q. The same result obtains for any other 
En that stands for typical evidence for Q. The same happens in many cases in which En stands for 
atypical evidence for Q. Suppose for instance En = E*. E isn’t a defeater for the support that [E*, 
and E* supports Q] provides for Q. For the conjunction E & [E*, and E* supports Q] supports Q. 
This is so because, since E* entails E, E & [E*, and E* supports Q] is logically equivalent to [E*, 
and E* supports Q], which supports Q.  
In conclusion, since E and Q satisfy both (i) and (ii), EEE4’s antecedent is satisfied. 
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